On May 8th, 10am-1pm, we will talk about the dynamic game under perfect information. We will introduce subgame perfect equilibrium in both finite- and infinite-horizon games. Please read MWG 9.B, 12.D, 12.App.A and B. It's also helpful to read F-T Chp 4 (and Chp 3 and 5 if you have more time).
Also on that day Peng and Virginia will present two applications of repeated game, namely, tacit collusion and efficient wage bargaining, respectively. Peng's presentation will be based on the paper by Ivaldi et. al. (2003); and Virginia's presentation will be based on Paz Espinosa and Rhee (1989), which can be downloaded at JSTOR. Their presentation slides are here and here.
Slides are here. Suggested exercises are here.
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