The last two lectures will be devoted to games of incomplete information. On May 13rd, 2-5pm, we will talk about static games of incomplete information. We will first introduce the notion of "type" and "belief," and the equilibrium concept in this environment, namely, Bayesian equilibrium (MWG 8.E, and FT 6.1-5). As an application we will talk about mechanism design (MWG 23.B, D, E, and FT 7.1-4).
On the same day we have two presentations about two applications of mechanism design. Ilaria will present public goods provision (MWG 23.D and/or FT 7.4.3), and Caterina will present Armstrong's 1996 paper on multiproduct nonlinear pricing. You can download the paper on JSTOR. There slides are here and here.
Slides are here. Suggested exercises are here.
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2 comments:
for those who are interested, my other presentation references are:
1)D’Aspremont, Gérard-Varet: Incentives and incomplete information, 1979 JPE: the paper of the main mechanism I'm going to show;
2)Mechanism design theory, Compiled by the Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2007: a very simple explanation of mechanism design theory and his applications.
Great! Thx for the information Ilaria!
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